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JUDGE OGDEN HOFFMAN
And the Northern District of California
BY CHRISTIAN

I'm

G.

FRITZ

delighted to be here today and to talk to you

about one of my favorite subjects, Ogden Hoffman and the early
history of the United States District Court for the Northern
District of California. It seems particularly appropriate to me that
we've gathered in the ceremonial courtroom, presided over in a
sense by the spirit of Ogden Hoffman and certainly by his portrait
that hangs to the rear of this room. Just as that portrait gives us a
visual sense of the man, I hope to provide a sketch of Hoffman as a
judge and leave you with an impression of his forty years on this
bench.
First, I'd like to talk about his background. Then I will discuss
three areas of law important to Hoffman's court: admiralty, land,
and Chinese immigration. Finally, I'd like to assess the meaning of
Hoffman's judgeship in contrast to that of United States Supreme
Court Associate Justice Stephen J. Field.
Born and raised in New York, Hoffman came from a very old and
respected Dutch family. He grew up taking a fierce pride in what
he called his "long descent from an historic name." Both his father
and grandfather had taken prominent roles in the political and
legal affairs of the state. Hoffman's father, in particular, became
one of the preeminent criminal trial lawyers of his generation and
ultimately served as the United States Attorney for the Southern
District of New York.
The impressive legal and political accomplishments of the
Hoffinans helped give them access to the highest circles of New
York society. The combination of social and literary figures,
politicians and financiers that formed his father's circle was an
experience that Hoffman never forgot. Indeed, he claimed it as his
birthright.
Christian G. Fritz is Assistant Professor of Law at the School of
Law, University of New Mexico. This article was transcribed and
edited from a talk given by Professor Fritz at a meeting of the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California Historical
Society on June 11, 1986 in San Francisco.
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Judge Ogden Hoffman, Jr., 1822-1891. Educated
at Columbia University and Harvard College,
New York lawyer Hoffman moved to California
in 1850 and a year later was appointed by
President Fillmore as the new state's first
district judge. He presided over the majority
of the land grant cases and his court gained a
strong reputation - among both passengers
and commercial interests - in admiralty.
Frustrated at not being appointed to a higher
court, Hoffman nevertheless remained
committed to his work in San Francisco,
serving forty years as a district judge there.
(U.S. District Court, Northern District of
California)
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Hoffman's enormous pride in his family and his background is
vital to understanding not only his character but his selfperception as a judge. As the only judge for the northern district
during its first forty years, Hoffman came to directly identify with
the court. He was the court. Attacks on the court were seen as
personal attacks. His personality thus assumed a major role in
how the institution itself functioned and responded.
Like his grandfather and father, Hoffman was also extravagant.
All three tended to spend more than they could afford and, despite
numerous professional opportunities, were unable to provide
financial security for themselves and their families. Hoffman's
grandfather spent his last year dodging creditors, and when
Hoffman's father died he left his family with tremendous debts.
Indeed, friends and political allies were forced to take up a
collection in order to stave off the disgrace of destitution. Hoffman
as well, although he never married, was apparently perpetually in
debt and, even though he experienced a financial windfall in the
1870s, died a relatively poor man in 1891.
Hoffman had quite a good education. He received his B.A. from
Columbia and then attended Harvard Law School (class of 1842)
while Joseph Story was still teaching there. In addition Hoffman
received the more common practical training of reading law for
several years in the offices of New York lawyers. After passing the
bar, Hoffman, like many law graduates today, took a well deserved
vacation. In his case he went to Europe and spent a considerable
amount of time in Paris. Upon his return to New York, Hoffman
seemed restless and his father was after him to settle down and
seriously practice law. After about a year in his father's office,
Hoffman left for California in the wake of the gold rush, arriving
in San Francisco in May of 1850.
Hoffman's effort to succeed in San Francisco was ill-fated. The
frenetic pace of the gold rush bar, high inflation, the lack of social
deference, and his own propensity to spend money doomed his
success. One observer noted that a background such as Hoffman's
could be a liability. "Polished education without a strong
Democratic feeling" unfitted a man from taking part in such a
"hand-to-hand struggle" with other lawyers. Some business did
come Hoffman's way, however, mainly from New York
connections, but inflation ate up most of what he made. Moreover,
Hoffman, unlike other lawyers, was not about to sleep on the floor
of his office to save money. Indeed, to maintain himself as a
gentleman undoubtedly placed him under a severe financial
strain.
Hoffman's struggle at the bar was cut short, happily for him, by
his appointment as judge of the northern district less than one
year after he arrived in San Francisco. He was only twenty-nine
years old.
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The story of Hoffman's appointment is quite a complex one and
really beyond the scope of this talk. Suffice it to say that behind
Hoffman's appointment loomed the figure of his father, whose
good friend Daniel Webster was President Millard Fillmore's
secretary of state. In addition to his father's influence and efforts,
Hoffman found strong support from William H. Aspinwall,
the president of the New York owned Pacific Mail Steamship
Company the firm that provided a vital transportation link
between California and the East Coast.
Aspinwall hoped that Hoffman, whom he knew as his son's
youthful friend, would declare the taxation of his vessels by
California unconstitutional. Whatever the expectations of
Hoffman's judgeship, his youth and relative inexperience were
major objections to his appointment on February 1, 1851.
Hoffman's first test as a judge came in his admiralty docket. A
great many of those who came to California during the gold rush
arrived in San Francisco by sea, and the city quickly became the
state's foremost port and commercial center. The many sailing
vessels that choked San Francisco's harbor in the 1850s led an
observer to describe them as "a perfect forest of masts." Such a
"forest" guaranteed a tremendous admiralty docket. In fact,
Hoffman would hear over three thousand cases during the first
decade he was on the bench.
Although many of these cases, some 40 percent, were libels for
wages by seamen, Hoffman's admiralty court was most frequently
used as an important commercial tribunal by San Francisco's
businessmen and merchants. The commercial litigation tended to

"Forest of Masts" panorama of the Gold Rush fleet in San Francisco harbor
in early 1851. (National Maritime Museum and Smithsonian Institution)
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San Francisco, 1858. (Huntington Library)

fall into two broad categories: suits for nondelivery or damage to
goods shipped to San Francisco and suits for payment for supplies,
repairs, services, or money provided a ship.
Hoffman's relationship with the business community was
ultimately something of an ambivalent one. While he frequently
rendered decisions that were highly unpopular to that group, his
court provided a very useful forum, and collectively businessmen
became Hoffman's staunchest defenders. The source of that
support and the respect Hoffman received from the business
community stemmed far less from the substantive results of his
decisions than from his manner of handling admiralty matters.
From the first case Hoffman adjudicated he was determined to
demonstrate his legal scholarship. He was, of course, relatively
young and mindful of the fact that he needed to prove himself,
especially to the local bar. This impulse manifested itself in the
extended factual discussions and the scholarly productions of his
earliest opinions.
While Hoffman may have impressed lawyers and businessmen
with his erudition, he won their support by insisting that his court
be true to the traditional de-emphasis of procedure in admiralty,
by hearing the testimony of witnesses and arguments of counsel
with patience, by sifting and weighing evidence and arguments
with extraordinary conscientiousness, and by exhibiting a fierce
judicial independence.
Despite the crush of business before his court, particularly in
the first decade of its existence, Hoffman took the time to insure
that litigants had their day in court. With cases that came to trial,
Hoffman invariably took notes that in effect created a transcript
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of the testimony presented in court. In the commercial cases these
notes ranged in length from just a few pages to several hundred
pages and symbolized his close attention to detail.
One of the most fascinating series of cases Hoffman dealt with
in admiralty concerned his handling of the grievances experienced
by passengers coming to California in the wake of the gold rush.
One historian of this event has entitled his book The World
Rushed In, which captures, I think, the essence of the experience
of San Francisco in the 1850s.* The eagerness to get to California,
whether from the East Coast of the United States or from Australia
or other parts of the world, led to the terrible conditions under
which such argonauts traveled.
Upon their arrival in San Francisco, passengers often brought
suit before Hoffman's court alleging that the carriers, the ships
that brought them to the city, had violated their passenger
contract. If the carriers had deliberately overbooked or were
unable to provide the promised provisions and accommodations,
the issue was readily resolved as a breach of contract.
More interesting is the process whereby Hoffman became
increasingly innovative in providing legal relief for passengers and
in facilitating their law suits. In the early 1850s Hoffman allowed
several passengers to join in one suit - a type of class action - to
overcome costs and time that made individual suits impractical.
Moreover, he permitted passengers to sue in rem (i.e., to sue the
vessel), in effect to hold shipowners responsible not only for the
negligence but also for the intentional torts of their employees. In
so doing, Hoffman developed a theory of implied passenger
contract that converted what were essentially tort claims into
contract actions. In Hoffman's words the passenger contract was
breached "whether the passenger be deprived of suitable food and
accommodations or be subjected to ill usage by blows and false
imprisonment or by habitual obscenity, insult and opposition."
Hoffman's willingness to stretch the passenger contract to
include torts stemmed in part from his seeing himself as the only
hope for many of the passengers who had suffered during their
voyages to California. Moreover, he had personal knowledge of the
conditions complained about, having traveled by steamship from
New York to San Francisco via the Panama route. His sensibilities
as a gentleman were particularly outraged when women bore the
brunt of hardship, ill-treatment, or lewd behavior. Indeed, virtually
all of the suits based on rudeness and verbal abuse involved
women.
Giving relief by allowing passengers to sue ships in rem helped,
but did not complete, the process of educating the ship owners
*J. S. Holliday, The World Rushed In; The CaliforniaGold Rush:
An Eyewitness Account of a Nation HeadingWest (New York,
1981).
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about their duty to passengers. Punitive damages in cases of
flagrant abuses provided yet another means of monitoring
behavior on the high seas. In the face of profits to be made in
transporting human cargo, Hoffman declared that "it is only by the
firm and constant enforcement by the courts of the rights of
passengers that the repetition of abuses [against them] can be
prevented." In taking such a stance, Hoffman clearly disappointed
William H. Aspinwall, whose Pacific Mail Steamship Company
often found itself before the northern district. We can only
speculate whether Hoffman's judicial reputation insured him a
comfortable passage during his subsequent visits to New York.

LAND
If the law of the sea initially preoccupied Hoffman's court, by
the mid-1850s he began hearing a series of cases dealing with title
to California's most valuable lands. Arising as appeals from a
specially created federal land board, these cases involved claims to
often vast ranchos based on land grants issued by the Mexican
government. Under the terms of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo,
the United States promised to respect the Mexican ownership of
property within California. The Mexican land grants that predated
the American conquest in 1846 ultimately became the focus of
bitter controversy lasting several decades.
One claimant summed up the frustrations of many others when
he declared in 1857: "That we should be kept back to be made the
foot ball for squatters and speculators and lawyers to kick at is
something I never looked for when I invested my money in this
property." This complaint by a non-Hispanic Californian points up
a common myth about the state's early land disputes. It is often
assumed that the decisions of the American courts were responsible for depriving California's Hispanics of their most valuable
lands. In fact, over 40 percent of the land claims presented were
filed by non-Hispanics. California's Hispanics did indeed lose
much of their land to the Anglos, but it is important to keep in
mind how many claims passed out of their hands prior to and
during the litigation before the courts and how relatively few as a
result of the decisions of those courts. Indeed, the adjudication
over California's land grants assumed a distinctly national
character, with significant individual and collective interests in
such claims centered in Washington, D.C., Philadelphia, and
New York City.
One case in particular, San Francisco's claim for its pueblo lands,
pitted Judge Hoffman against his colleague, Associate Justice
Stephen J. Field of the United States Supreme Court. As successor
to the Mexican town of Yerba Buena, San Francisco claimed it was
entitled under Mexican law to approximately eighteen thousand
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United States Clrcult Court for California.
United States Courthouse, San Francisco, Ca. 1858. (California State
Library)
acres. These pueblo lands were the keystone to an extraordinarily
complex and attenuated land struggle. For the purpose of today's
talk, however, the most interesting aspect of this struggle is the
contrast in judicial style, so to speak, between Hoffman and Field.
Stephen Field was on the California Supreme Court for six years
and presided as its chief justice at the time of his appointment to
the United States Supreme Court in 1863. By that date Hoffman
had more than a decade's experience on the northern district
court and some, including Judge Hoffman, felt that the promotion
to the higher federal bench was his by rights. If Hoffman's
disappointment at being passed over created some tension
between the two judges, Field's aggressive approach toward settling
the pueblo case deeply strained their relationship.
By the early 1860s San Franciscans could perceive important
differences in the attitudes of these two judges toward the pueblo
title. Hoffman seemed to be dubious about the existence of the
pueblo and his general approach to the land grant adjudication
emphasized the technical requirements under Mexican law. On
the other hand, Field had clearly indicated his support for the
existence of a pueblo and seemed determined to see it confirmed.
From the moment of his appointment, Field sought to gain
control over the pueblo case, which was technically before
Hoffman's court. In conjunction with a political ally, Senator John
Conness of California, Field worked to insure that San Francisco's
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pueblo title was confirmed and that Hoffman's judgeship was
eliminated in the process. The failure of bills that struck at his
judgeship could not erase Hoffman's bitterness that Field had
plotted with Conness to do him in.
Field did manage to get jurisdiction over the pueblo case and, as
expected, promptly and perfunctorily confirmed the city's claim.
Field's refusal to hear arguments against the existence of a pueblo
and his refusal to allow an appeal to the Supreme Court
underscored his determination to settle the case. Indeed, even
after the Supreme Court, with Field vigorously dissenting, granted
a writ of mandamus directing Field as the circuit justice to allow
the appeal, Field refused to acquiesce. While the pueblo case
remained in the Supreme Court docket pending appeal, Field
drafted a bill that Conness introduced into the Senate to confirm
San Francisco's title. The bill passed in March 1866 and effectively
ended an ongoing struggle of sixteen years.
How Field and Hoffman viewed their role as judges was shaped
in part by their different characters, while the clash of their
personalities tended to accentuate differences between them. It
may well be that their contrasting behavior in part reflected the
fact that Field's judicial experience was primarily appellate while
Hoffman mainly served as a trial judge. Each man's perception of
the appropriate role for a judge and the nature of the judicial
process, however, had a far greater impact on the degree of
restraint or activism that each employed in doing his job. Field had
the utmost confidence in his ability to perceive the problems
inherent in the struggle over the pueblo title and to devise the
appropriate solution for it. He proceeded with aggressive
determination, and even if contemporaries questioned his means,
there was no denying that he ended a troublesome dispute.
To a man of action such as Field, Hoffman's careful,
conscientious, and seemingly plodding approach to judicial
questions must have seemed unnecessary or even a sign of
weakness. At the same time, Field's heavy hand in resolving the
pueblo dispute and his legislative collaboration with Conness
insulted Hoffman's pride and estranged him from California's
circuit justice.
CHINESE IMMIGRATION
The clash between Field and Hoffman over the pueblo case
marked only the beginning. The two judges would be at odds once
again in the 1880s over the issue of Chinese immigration.
With reference to the Chinese, Field is best known for his
decisions pertaining to the Fourteenth Amendment, of which
Yick Wo v Hopkins is perhaps his most famous opinion. Field's
decisions in the Chinese civil rights cases had in a sense less to do
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with the Chinese than they did with Field's particular view of the
Fourteenth Amendment and the judiciary's role in maintaining a
balance between business and government. The important
doctrinal legacy of these civil rights opinions has obscured
another series of cases that had a far greater practical impact on
the Chinese in America.
Far less well known are the over seven thousand habeas corpus
cases brought by the Chinese in Hoffman's court after 1882. In
resolving whether the Chinese petitioners were unlawfully
detained by federal customs officers, Hoffman embarked on a
series of cases that would preoccupy him for nearly a decade. In
the process he allowed many thousands of Chinese into San
Francisco despite intense pressure not to.
Nonetheless, there was a big difference between what Hoffman
said and did about the Chinese appearing before him. Along with
most white Californians - including most of the lawyers
representing the Chinese and the other federal judges serving the
Far West (including Field) - Hoffman favored the restriction of
Chinese immigration and regarded them as racial inferiors.
Anti-Chinese sentiment had long existed in California, but the
movement to exclude them peaked in the 1870s. Part of that
pressure resulted in the renegotiation in 1880 of the Burlingame
Treaty with China. The revised treaty continued to extend "most
favored nation" status to the Chinese already in the country while
giving Congress the right to suspend the immigration of Chinese
laborers. In 1882 Congress passed the first of several laws designed
to halt the influx of Chinese laborers. Interpreting these so-called
restriction acts in the light of the treaty proved no easy task.
From the very beginning San Francisco's customs officials
refused to land virtually every Chinese person who arrived by sea
and questioned their right to seek writs of habeas corpus from
Hoffman's court. At the heart of most of the habeas corpus cases
was the factual question of whether the Chinese petitioner was a
laborer (and thus excludable) or was a merchant or a returning
resident who had simply gone to China on a visit (and was thus
entitled to entry). Ultimately, the tremendous number of
petitioners seeking relief from the northern district induced
Hoffman to nickname his court "the HabeasCorpus Mill."
There were two aspects to these cases: the hearings themselves,
after which Hoffman rendered a decision, usually without a
written opinion, and some dozen "test cases" that sought to discuss
the interpretation of the restriction acts more generally. While
Field participated in these "test cases," he took no part in the
individual hearings.
In fact, as California's circuit justice, Field presided over these
"test cases" when he was in San Francisco. Initially, Field agreed
with Hoffman that the restriction act should be interpreted in the
light of the treaty with China. However, with increasing public
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pressure adversely affecting his bid for the United States
presidency, Field reversed himself and took a much harder line
toward the Chinese. On the other hand, Hoffman steadfastly
upheld the treaty with China. In 1884 the Supreme Court
vindicated Hoffman's position, but not before he came in for
considerable abuse from the local press,
In some sense the institutional pressure on Hoffman's court
came from his own commitment to judicial due process. By
insisting that each detained Chinese person had a right to
challenge his imprisonment, Hoffman insured himself of a
crowded docket. Moreover, such hearings could be protracted
because Hoffman held that the Chinese were entitled to present
any evidence that might establish their unlawful confinement.
Denial of access to his court or of the right to testify and
present evidence was not merely a violation of basic rights to a fair
trial guaranteed by the treaty with China and the Fourteenth
Amendment, but also ran counter to Hoffman's conception of his
role as a federal judge. He refused to abdicate the decision of
Chinese exclusion to customs officials regardless of the grief it
caused him. Despite serious misgivings, Hoffman felt obliged to
render decisions that, in his words, suggested he was "engaged in a
persistent effort to defeat on technical grounds the operation of
the law."
Eventually, proponents of unilateral exclusion of Chinese
laborers prevailed with federal legislation enacted in 1888. Even
then, however, Hoffman refused to allow the local customs officers
to bully him into denying due process to those Chinese who
sought relief before the northern district.
Perhaps the most fascinating question about Hoffman's
behavior in these cases is why he didn't avail himself of the many
options that could have relieved the pressure of his court. At
one level, his adherence to treaty obligations and procedural
guarantees provides answers In the final analysis, however, I
would suggest that Hoffman's experience as a trial judge, rather
than his attitudes toward treaties, procedure, or judicial
independence, proved more determinative of the fact that
thousands of Chinese walked out of his courtroom.
Despite his generalized bias against the Chinese, in his court
he did not face "the Chinese;' but rather individual Chinese
petitioners. The thousands of separate hearings individualized the
Chinese and forced Hoffman to see and hear them as human
beings with distinct explanations and histories that had to be
dealt with on a case-by-case basis. Hoffman ultimately could not
maintain the detachment of Field, who only heard test cases in
which the Chinese petitioner at hand was largely incidental. For
instance, Hoffman expressed his delight at being able to avoid
separating Chinese children from their parents. Likewise, he
repeatedly spoke of the admirable and respectable qualities of
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individual Chinese even as he decried their limitations as a race.
In contrast, Field, whose vision remained unclouded by the
intensity of human interaction faced by Hoffman, would speak in
sweeping terms about how to deal with "the Chinese problem." His
perspective did not include the need to look at the Chinese
coming before the federal courts as individuals.
As a trial judge, Hoffman found himself enmeshed in a far more
complicated process. Despite his strong desire to be rid of "the
habeas corpus mill," Hoffman could not avoid those cases without
repudiating his concept of judicial review and duty. By adhering to
that call to duty, his court gave thousands of Chinese the chance
to convince him on an individual basis that they were entitled to
their freedom to enter the country.
In summing up Ogden Hoffman's judgeship, it is perhaps
appropriate to cast a glance at his more famous colleague Stephen
Field. Without a doubt Field had a brilliant mind and his thirtyfour years on the United States Supreme Court left an important
impact on the doctrinal history of American law. In that sense,
Field was a great judge in a way that Hoffman was not. At the same
time, it seems to me that if we compare the two in terms of those
qualities we value in a judge - evenhandedness, being apolitical,
and conscientiousness - Hoffman emerges as the better judge. It
is ironic to think that some of the qualities that insured Field's
importance as a legal figure - his dynamism and singlemindedness - detracted from his judicial capacity,
In the final analysis, Hoffman's life and judgeship tell us far
more about the nature of federal courts and process in the
ninteenth century. There were, after all, far more Hoffmans than
Fields. And despite his faults as a man and a judge, Hoffman
emerges as a sympathetic character worth our attention in his
own right. Hoffman's judicial legacy was a proud one and marks
a fitting beginning to the history of this court.
The editor thanks Michael Griffith, Ph.D., Archivist of the U.S.
District Court for the Northern District of California, for his
assistance in preparing this article for publication.

